Choice, Control and Childbirth: Cesarean Deliveries on Maternal Request in Shanghai, China by Wang, Eileen
In Situ
Issue 1 In Situ 2016 Article 4
5-14-2016
Choice, Control and Childbirth: Cesarean
Deliveries on Maternal Request in Shanghai, China
Eileen Wang
University of Pennsylvania
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/insitu/vol5/iss1/4
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Choice, Control and Childbirth: Cesarean Deliveries on Maternal
Request in Shanghai, China
This article is available in In Situ: http://repository.upenn.edu/insitu/vol5/iss1/4
14
Choice, Control and Childbirth:
Cesarean Deliveries on Maternal Re-
quest in Shanghai, China 
Eileen Wang
Rates of cesarean deliveries—a surgical 
procedure used to deliver a baby through the 
mother’s abdomen—have risen dramatically in 
China within the past 25 years, from 3.4% in 
1988 to estimates of 58% in 2010 (Hellerstein, 
Feldman, and Duan 2014). There are a host of 
structural and provider factors contributing to this 
phenomenon in China including: rapid develop-
ment and urbanization; increasing hospitalization 
of births; low provider to patient ratio; a highly 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
incentives to perform cesarean sections (Heller-
stein, Feldman, and Duan 2014). Nevertheless, 
there are also an increasing number of women in 
China who directly request cesarean deliveries. 
In particular, the proportion of cesarean deliver-
ies on maternal request (CDMR), has increased 
dramatically from 2% of all cesareans in 1994 to 
28% in 2011 (Zhang et al. 2008; Liu et al. 2014)
which covers 21 cities and counties in two prov-
inces in southeast China. We examined the rate 
of cesarean delivery and cesarean delivery on 
maternal request in 1.1 million singleton births 
from 1994 to early 2006. Cesarean delivery on 
??????????????????????????????????????????
cesarean delivery for a singleton gestation with-
out contraindications for vaginal delivery at 38 
weeks of gestation or later. During the 13-year 
study period, the percentage of women who had 
high school or higher education increased from 
13% to 46%. The overall cesarean rate increased 
from 22% in 1994 to 60% in 2003 and moder-
ated to 56% in 2006. The corresponding rates 
of cesarean delivery on maternal request (per 
100 all deliveries. However, while C-sections are 
life-saving operations, unnecessary surgeries for 
low-risk mothers may lead to increased maternal 
and neonatal morbidity compared to spontaneous 
vaginal delivery (Lumbiganon et al. 2010). It also 
contributes to reproductive risks for women who 
wish to have more children in the future. 
Who are these women who request cesar-
eans? According to the literature, they are often 
of higher socioeconomic status, are older, live in 
cities, have health insurance (Tang, Li, and Wu 
2006). Researchers have also found that factors 
for their decision include anxiety about the inabil-
ity to complete a vaginal delivery, worry about 
fetal safety, concern about the effect of vaginal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ty to choose an auspicious delivery date. Other 
major factors include fear of pain – less than 1% 
of women in labor are given epidural analgesia—
as well as the demand for a “perfect” child or 
birth outcome, as a consequence of state policy 
restricting parents to one child (Tang, Li, and Wu 
2006).1 This family planning policy also shaped 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
lieve that there would be no future reproductive 
consequences to having a cesarean (Li and Zhao 
2007; Hellerstein, Feldman, and Duan 2014).
Given this landscape of childbirth, I was 
particularly interested in understanding the in-
terplay of all of the actors involved in the birth 
decision-making process and, in particular, at 
the moment of the request. To what extent are 
women’s requests acknowledged or rejected by 
doctors, and how do larger structural factors, like 
state policy, play into these doctor-patient interac-
tions? In other words: who decides how a mother 
delivers?
Ethnographic orientation
To explore this issue, I conducted eth-
??????????????????????????????????????????????
months at Jiangbei District Hospital, a medi-
um-sized, state-owned hospital. Provider salaries 
come from the government, although bonuses 
are paid by hospitals from user fees. Around 
2,400 deliveries occur there every year, a lit-
tle more than a third of which are by cesarean. 
During my two months, I was able to conduct 
participant-observation in the outpatient and 
inpatient departments, attend prenatal classes, 
and interview women, providers and family mem-
bers about birth and, in particular, delivery deci-
sion-making.
1  The state relaxed this family planning poli-
cy, also known as the “One-Child Policy,” in 2016. 
Now all couples are allowed two children. 
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??????????????????????????????????????????-
vestigate CDMR, which is more common among 
higher socioeconomic women, as noted in the 
literature. However, the majority of the women 
giving birth at Jiangbei only had a junior high or 
high school education and were typically migrants 
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
this demographic would not be conducive to my 
research question pertaining to CDMR. But as I 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
socioeconomic status did not matter in terms of 
who requested cesareans; instead, it mattered in 
terms of who received them, and whether the re-
quests were considered “legitimate.” This led me 
to further ask: who possesses the power to make 
delivery decisions within the Chinese medical 
system?
The state-provider-patient relationship
In China, the doctor-patient relationship is 
generally paternalistic. The doctor is seen as an 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
times doctors would perform an exam without 
informing the woman of what they were doing. In 
cases in which the physician recommended a ce-
sarean delivery for a medical reason, the woman 
almost always conceded. In turn, physicians are 
subordinate to the state in many ways. Doctors 
working in public hospitals are salaried state em-
ployees paid by government and have little say 
over working conditions or levels of pay (Yang 
2008). According to one OB/GYN, physicians are 
paid only 1600 renminbi per month (250 dollars), 
which must be complemented by bonuses based 
on the number of procedures they perform. 
In regards to cesarean decision-making, 
the Shanghai government has begun to control 
public hospitals’ C-section rates; if it goes above 
certain percentage, they will cut a portion of the 
hospital’s income. In response to this pressure, 
physicians and nurses have started to reduce un-
necessary C-sections, particularly those request-
ed by mothers. As Min Wang, a nurse-midwife at 
Jiangbei, told me, 
“Before the rules were looser. In other words 
- if you know that person, if the mother re-
quests it, or if the mother adamantly says, 
‘I want a cesarean’ - then [doctors] will 
allow it. So then in the cesarean indication 
box we would write “requested surgery.” 
But right now, everything is stricter. Now 
it’s not like if you want a cesarean you can 
have a cesarean. You have to have a med-
ical indication like macrosomia [excessive 
fetal birth weight], uterine scar, placenta 
previa [in which the baby’s placenta covers 
the opening in the mother’s cervix] or other 
medical issues. Before if you requested it 
they would give it to you. But now if you 
request it there is no way to give them a 
cesarean.”
With stricter controls on cesarean section 
???????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
deliveries. However, these restrictions on CDMRs 
are not foolproof policies. I found that women 
continue to request and receive cesareans in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
guidelines—challenging the paradigm of power 
structures in the state-provider-patient relation-
ship and demonstrating their agency in birth 
decision-making. 
Women who received requested cesareans
Who are these women who are able to 
navigate medical and state authority, and how are 
they able to do so? I found that, as indicated in 
the literature, those who requested and received 
a cesarean were more likely to be of high socio-
economic status. According to the logbook of ce-
sarean deliveries at Jiangbei, of women who re-
quested and received cesareans, 90 to 95% were 
of “VIP” status, or patients who had purchased 
private, more expensive rooms. The reasons for 
these requests were consistent with those found 
in previous research, which I have mentioned 
earlier. The ways in which these women defend-
ed their requests, however, provide insight into 
how they overcame medical and state authority. 
Some would refuse to change their personal deci-
sion, despite doctors’ recommendations. These 
women would often indirectly use money or their 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
care. Others who requested and received cesare-
an sections had conceived by in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). According to one of the doctors I inter-
viewed, requested cesarean deliveries were jus-
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???????????????????????????????????????????????
amount of economic investment already funneled 
into creating the “precious” baby. To them, cesar-
ean sections presented a safer, more controlled 
method to protect this investment during deliv-
????????????????????????????????????????????????
medicalized view of reproduction and childbirth. 
These examples also show how the predominant 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
decision-making may be complicated by women’s 
social and economic capital.
????????????????????????????????????????????
the majority of the nurse-midwives at Jiangbei 
requested cesareans when they gave birth, even 
as they discouraged other women from doing so. 
Like other women, they feared pain or the risk of 
vaginal birth to their baby. As nurse-midwife Fang 
Liu told me, 
“If you were to ask me which is better, 
????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????-
nite. Using what we have learned in our 
specialty training, we have learned vagi-
nal delivery is better because there’s less 
harm to the body, the recovery is faster, all 
that. But, if you told me to choose, I would 
still choose cesarean. It’s because I felt 
like I was just too afraid of childbirth pain. I 
felt like I was afraid of pain. I didn’t feel like 
I was the courageous type of person.”
Her story demonstrates how the calculus 
of decision-making depends on the role that one 
takes—whether as a provider who takes into ac-
count state and professional guidelines in medi-
cal-decision making, or as a woman who is giving 
birth herself. It also, again, raises questions about 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????-
sion-making.
Women who did not receive requested cesareans
As I mentioned previously, women of lower 
socioeconomic status request C-sections as well. 
However, they do not necessarily receive them 
because providers may not consider their re-
quests legitimate. Granted, the majority of these 
women I interviewed did not prefer cesarean 
deliveries and did not request them before labor. 
Still, even as they asked for one during labor due 
to the experience of labor pain, the providers 
would simply ignore, dismiss, or roll their eyes at 
them. 
 But a request is a request. I argue that 
the reasons women request cesareans before 
labor are the same as those who request it during 
labor, except the former is in response to the 
fear of pain and labor whereas the latter is in 
response to the experience of it. In either case, 
their reasoning for cesarean delivery was not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
lower socioeconomic status women who request 
cesareans during labor, physicians paternalisti-
cally assume that they can handle the pain or that 
they do not really know what they “really want” 
because they are not making a rational risk-ben-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
requests as valid thus effectively renders these 
women’s appeals invisible. It dismisses the legit-
imacy of their claim to agency and control over 
childbirth. This view, perpetuated by scholars 
examining only the cesarean deliveries requested 
by mothers ???????????????????????, brushes over 
the lived experiences of all Chinese women, as 
well as the underlying doctor-patient power dy-
namics that construct the “legitimate request.”
In summary, I have noted that the state 
?????????????????????????????????????????????-
ity in controlling the childbirth process in China, 
although women may have the ability to navigate 
that authority in the form of CDMR. However, this 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
such medical decisions are not necessarily based 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-
sons. That many women continue to demand ce-
sarean sections point to larger issues beyond the 
power dynamics in the medical system including: 
the medicalization of childbirth, lack of pain relief 
or social support during labor, and the One-Child 
Policy – topics beyond the scope of this paper. 
While top-down Chinese policies have been more 
or less effective in reducing cesarean section 
rates, they have done little to affect the underly-
ing environment generating fear of vaginal child-
birth. This can only be addressed by adjusting 
norms, changing population reproductive policies, 
providing universal pain relief, and offering social 
support for all women. 
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